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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
In this project, I examine the philosophical theories of truth, gender, and power, 
and the parallels between each theory.  I argue that both Friedrich Nietzsche and William 
James advanced theories that deconstructed the idea that human beings, or “man” and 
“woman,” were bound by an essential nature or innate characteristics that determined 
their social role.  Though this critique was robust, I argue that it enforces gender 
disempowerment on a number of platforms since the theories did not analyze gender, but 
rather truth and value.  Simone de Beauvoir, I argue, expanded Nietzsche’s and James’ 
thought, but included a critical analysis of gender and disempowerment.  De Beauvoir’s 
idea that gender identities are imposed and created by power defines gender as a social-
construct, and something that individuals, though only privileged “man,” have autonomy 
over. Though this analysis is extensive and emancipatory, I argue that de Beauvoir, by 
defining “woman” as something that it, e.g. the “other” gender related to “man,” de 
Beauvoir establishes as unified category of gender which entails exclusion of individuals 
who do not fall under these rigid categories.  I argue that Judith Butler’s conception of 
gender as an imposed mechanism by power to define, classify, and separate individuals is 
the most exhaustive and inclusive conception of gender among the authors that I 
examine, and actively subverts the oppressive practices of sociopolitical power. 
 
 
Keywords: Anti-essentialism, gender binary, philosophy of gender, feminist theory.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Philosophers William James and Friedrich Nietzsche, writing respectively within 
the late-19
th
, and James into the early-20
th
, century developed extensive philosophical 
analyses devoted to critiquing essentialist and metaphysical theories that had influenced 
Western thought within the discipline of philosophy since Plato.  James’ approach 
grounded truth through a subjective means of practice, thus defining truth and value in 
terms of its practical import and its ability to make sense of the external world.
1
  James’ 
understanding of truth on a large, social scale was a repeated practice of some types of 
subjective maxims.  Truth is related to its practical, real-world usage, and this practical 
usage determines its value within a society.  Mathematical concepts, James argued, are 
not platonic entities that exist beyond human experience within some metaphysical realm, 
but rather subjective concepts that were created and practiced for their practical usage 
within the physical world, e.g. their ability to help human beings make sense of the world 
within scientific discourse.  The repeated practice of these fictional concepts ground them 
as socially-constructed truths.  Truth and empirical objects, anything existing in the 
physical world, have no essential properties or natures.  Rather, truth is created by 
subjects.   
                                                          
1
 William James, “What Pragmatism Means,” Pragmatism, in William James: Writings 1902-1910, ed. 
Bruce Kuklick and the Library of America (New York, New York: Penguin Publishing, 1987): 508-509.  
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 Nietzsche expressed a similar anti-essentialist understanding of truth and 
metaphysical concepts, claiming that truth is an individualistic construction.  Through 
Nietzsche’s thought experiment of “the Death of God,” metaphysics and objective truth 
lose all bearing upon the physical world—in fact, the physical or experiential world is the 
only world that exists.
2
  Metaphysical realities are fictitious concepts conjured in order to 
give individuals meaning and power over their existence, and to allow truth, in an 
objectively binding sense, to have significance and import.  The gods Nietzsche criticizes 
are represented in both rationalistic thought that emerged from the Enlightenment, that 
established truth within a large metaphysical system of reality, as well as Christian 
doctrine, thin addition to the god of Judeo-Christian traditions who established truth 
within doctrine and laws.  Nietzsche understands both Christian and rationalistic 
systematization as the manipulation of truth into a metaphysical or supernatural 
“beyond,” which enables individual beings to find meaning and structure under the threat 
of chaos and meaninglessness.   
This understanding of truth, Nietzsche claims, forces the individual being away 
from themselves and places emphasis on a reality that does not exist.  Reality, as 
Nietzsche describes it, is purely empirical sensibility; anything beyond sensible objects is 
nonexistent.
3
  Thus, metaphysical reality is nonexistent, and truth and value are purely 
subjectively-created concepts.  Nietzsche denies the existence of truth in-itself, existing 
as an objective entity that determines the nature of the physical world, and describes truth 
as an individual creation, based upon their own desires and drives.  Truth, individuals, 
                                                          
2
 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Madman,” The Gay Science, Trans. Walter Kauffmann (New York, NY: 
Vintage Books, 1974): 181-182.  
3
 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Reasons,” Twilight of the Idols, Trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997): 19-20. 
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and physical reality are not essential in nature.  Rather, truth is synthetic.  Truth is created 
by individuals based upon their desires, instead of truth determining reality and 
individual desires.  Nietzsche philosophy was highly influential in 19
th
 century social 
theory and psychology, often influencing social and political movements that he was 
situated amongst within his historical context.  These particular sociopolitical movements 
criticized notions of sexuality and gender relations as being understood as essentially 
different, but still operated within essentialism.  Feminist movements simply claimed that 
there was no essential difference between masculinity and femininity, rather than 
transcending essentialism altogether.      
 It is clear to see that both James and Nietzsche are both describing a version of 
truth and reality that is anti-metaphysical and anti-essentialist.  Rather than truth existing 
within the objective realm of metaphysics, it is created and practiced by individuals in 
order to determine their own version of reality and nature.  Reality, objects, and existence 
have no essential properties that exist beyond their practice or interpretation and 
determine their existence within the world.  This understanding of truth shows a 
paradigm shift from essentialist notions of reality to anti-essentialism within 
philosophical analysis.  
One may think that gender essentialism, the view that gender, masculine and 
feminine, is produced by essentialized sexual difference, now has no place within anti-
essentialist thought.  Anti-essentialism refutes the idea of anything existing as essential, 
therefore essential natures of sex and gender, determined by metaphysical concepts, 
cannot exist under this paradigm of thought.  One would assume that this conception of 
truth and reality would undermine all forms of essentialism, including gender 
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essentialism; however, as I will argue in the forthcoming chapter, they do not.  Both 
Nietzsche and James tend to enforce binaried understandings of gender within social 
structures.  Gender essentialism and its resultant disempowerment can become an 
individualist or social practice, where gender binaries and gender oppression can be 
argued to improve social relations to efficiently function.  James’ conception of truth 
makes no effort to analyze gender or its relation within the paradigm of truth and social 
practice.  Though it deflates the idea that sex and gender are essentially determined, and 
arguments that rest upon the idea that the gender binary is essentially derived are now 
challenged and deconstructed, it still allows for a paradigm of gender disempowerment.  
No argument can be given to satisfy this flaw, which operates under James’ 
understanding.  James also justifies a notion of a sex and gender binary, thus entailing 
oppression and exclusion of any individual who operates outside of this binary.   
Nietzsche’s thought succumbs to the same fault.  As I will demonstrate, 
Nietzsche’s conception of truth and value does criticize and disprove arguments for 
gender oppression and binaried social relations based on essential characteristics.
4
  
However, disempowerment and binaried social relations can be enforced by being 
supported as subjective creations based on willful desire and drives.  Social relations can 
easily adopt a binaried structure of gender and justify this relation through action upon 
subjective desire and maxims.  Also, Nietzsche’s anti-essentialist philosophy does 
nothing to dismantle a binary of sex or gender, or challenge the notion that sex or gender 
may have more than two rigid and unmixable categories.  Thus, Nietzsche’s thought also 
entails oppression and exclusion, and is not a critique of binaried social understandings.  
Neither James nor Nietzsche analyzed gender disempowerment under their conception of 
                                                          
4
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 182. 
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truth and value.  Anti-essentialism, though providing useful arguments to undermine 
gender essentialism and disempowerment based on essentially different sexual natures, 
does not critically analyze gender and gendered social relations.  It is not until, I will 
argue, the mid-to-late-20
th
 century that gender is critically analyzed under a philosophical 
paradigm.     
Philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, I will argue, synthesized anti-essentialist 
thought into a working critique of gender disempowerment and binaried social relations.  
De Beauvoir reworked and reanalyzed the shortcomings of anti-essentialist thought, but 
used anti-essentialism and notions of subjectively or socially-imposed truth within her 
own framework, which sought to critically engage gender disempowerment and the 
various social and intellectual theories that were analyzing gender.  De Beauvoir held the 
belief that gender and sexuality were distinct entities, and neither of which were 
essentially determined to behave and operate in any certain way.  This belief is justified 
through anti-essentialist arguments, reinforced through James and Nietzsche.  However, 
de Beauvoir critically analyzes gender and claims that notions and relations of gender are 
contingent upon the values and truths of a socio-historical situation.  Simply put, social 
norms and understandings regarding gender are adopted and applied to society as 
objective facts about the nature of gender and reality.   
De Beauvoir understands these norms as being synthetically imposed by 
structures of power and privilege, rather than being objectively true and essential.  Norms 
are created and reinforced through social relations and institutions, and these norms are 
merely synthetically created by systems of power in order to maintain their power.  
Though de Beauvoir goes much further in criticizing gender disempowerment and its 
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relation to essentialism, she operates within the framework of anti-essentialism, primarily 
the framework of James and Nietzsche. Anti-essentialist understandings of truth and 
reality are utilized by de Beauvoir, but synthesized in order to create a critical 
understanding of gender and power within the discipline of academic philosophy.  I will 
argue in the following work that James’ and Nietzsche’s anti-essentialist thought was 
influential yet harmful to a philosophical understanding and of gender and a critique of 
gender disempowerment, and was later modified to serve as a critical analysis of gender 
and unjust social relations by de Beauvoir. 
Though de Beauvoir establishes a philosophical critique of essentialism and 
gender disempowerment, she still operates under a gender binary, and in attempting to 
define “woman” and the context of “woman” as unified, de Beauvoir consequently 
defines “woman’s” situation as essential.  For de Beauvoir, “woman” is defined as 
“Other,” in relation to” man,” no matter the socio-historical context that defines either 
gender identity.  Thus, de Beauvoir’s critique consequently establishes a unified 
definition of “woman” and operates under the understanding of a two-gender-two-sex 
model, which enforces a gender binary and essentializes “woman” through an idea of a 
unified definition.  De Beauvoir’s critique of gender disempowerment within the context 
of anti-essentialism in compelling and liberating, since disempowerment based on an 
essential nature has no grounding; however, that understanding fails also to be 
exhaustive, since it operates within a gender binary and unifies “woman” and the 
oppression of “woman” under an essential definition.  
Judith Butler, writing respectively within third-wave feminist movement of the 
1990s, recognizes the problematic consequences of de Beauvoir’s theory.  As Butler 
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understands the history of feminist theory, feminism has consistently attempted to unify 
“woman” in order to create a subject for sociopolitical recognition and emancipation.  
Though this methodology is tempting, it is problematic.  First, as Butler claims, by 
assuming a unified definition of “woman,” feminism operates under the same 
exclusionary and oppressive model that subordinates “woman” in the first place.5  A 
unified definition of “woman” fails to account for other facets of one’s identity, such as 
race, class, and sexual orientation.  It also assumes that there is a unified and essentially 
binding criterion of identity that all of “woman” shares, which fails to account for 
cultural or social differences in subjects.
6
   
Butler also claims that the idea of sociopolitical emancipation, which is the goal 
of feminist theory, is itself a paradox.  In order to gain sociopolitical emancipation, 
“woman” has to appeal to a political power structure which has the ability to recognize 
and equalize subjects.  When feminist theory appeals to this structure, however, it appeals 
to the structure of power that is responsible for its subjugation in the first place.
7
 The 
paradox of feminist theory is that it seeks emancipation through oppressive means and 
appeals to the source of its subjugation for emancipation.  Feminist theory is in need of a 
new critique of gender, power, and sexed categories that transcend the normal restrictions 
of a binary and essential identity.  Butler offers a new method critique for feminist 
theory.  In the work that follows, I will maintain the idea that anti-essentialist thought 
fails to critique gender disempowerment outside of an essentialist understanding, while 
de Beauvoir fails to transcend a gender binary and offer a fully anti-essentialist 
                                                          
5
 Judith Butler, “Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire,” Gender Trouble (New York, New York: Routledge 
Classics, 2007): 4. 
6
 Butler, Gender Trouble, 6. 
7
 Butler, Gender Trouble, 2-3.  
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conception of gender identity, and that de Beauvoir entails a form of gender 
disempowerment because of this.  I will conclude that Butler’s conception of gender and 
identity is the most exhaustive theory to critique subversive power, essentialist notions, 
and gender disempowerment within the paradigm of philosophical analyses of gender or 
truth presented by Nietzsche, James, or Beauvoir.  I will also conclude that Butler offers a 
challenge to rigid and exclusionary tropes of masculinity and femininity.                        
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
NIETZSCHE, JAMES, AND SUBJECTIVITY 
 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche and William James were both situated within a particular 
tradition of Western philosophical thought.  Metaphysics, since Plato, had formulated 
truth to be objectively binding, existing beyond all human experience and interpretation.  
Plato, through his idea of metaphysical Forms, defined truth and reality in this way.  
Nietzsche and James were both responding to this interpretation of truth, and critically 
engaging its validity.  In the section that follows, I will examine Plato’s theory of the 
Forms, particularly his idea of the “divided line,” and the essential and metaphysical 
effects that stem from this theory.  Then, I will examine, in some detail, Nietzsche’s 
response to this interpretation, and his anti-essentialist understanding of truth and value.  
I will briefly highlight various social and intellectual movements that use Nietzsche 
arguments—that also influence Nietzsche’s work—to give context to Nietzsche’s anti-
essentialist thought, and detail a concrete example of its practice.  I will then examine 
James’ pragmatic understanding of truth, as a second anti-essentialist response to Plato.  
Last, I will highlight the success and failures of these anti-essentialist approaches to truth 
and essentialism, and their correlation to gender and binaried social relations.  
To best grasp Nietzsche’s and James’ anti-essentialist thought, it will be most 
helpful to examine Plato’s account of metaphysics and the essentialist understanding of 
objective reality that it entails.  This will also shed important light on how Nietzsche’s 
10 
 
and James’ ideology helped shape and structure de Beauvoir’s account of gender 
a social-construct.  Plato claims, in his work The Republic, that reality is divided into two 
realms: the physical-or-sensory realm, and the metaphysical-or-intelligible realm.
8
  For 
Plato, any object belonging in the sensory realm is a mere copy of its corresponding Form 
in the metaphysical realm.  So, for example, when some entity in the sensory realm is 
deemed as beautiful, this entity is appealing to the Form of beauty, and thus has the 
specific characteristics of beauty that the Form entails.  Form-object relation is essential 
and objective and the metaphysical Forms give structure to the physical objects.  Plato 
uses another example to demonstrate the physical-metaphysical nature of reality.  Plato 
uses the thought experiment of an individual comparing two sticks, both located in the 
sensory realm, that are equal in size.  Plato claims that the sticks are appealing to the 
Form of equality, which is located in the metaphysical realm.  For the sticks to be equal, 
and for an individual to know what the function of equality is, there must be an 
established, perfect Form of equality that an individual recognizes when making this 
comparison; or that entities mimic when they are sensibly equal.  The Form of equality is 
the essence of physical equality, and thus defines its ontological standing in the sensible 
realm.
9
  The Forms give things their essences, and all things have an essence.  Forms 
structure nature, and Forms are objective and perfect.  So, for Plato, every entity in the 
sensory realm has a specific and essential purpose and set of traits that is located in the 
metaphysical realm.  Metaphysical Forms are real and true, for Plato, and appearances are 
merely appealing to their essential Forms.  Platonic metaphysics, then, gives 
essentialism—of any kind—its grounding.  Essential natures must exist since the Forms 
                                                          
8
 Plato, “Book VI,” The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith, ed. G.R.F.F Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006): 509d-511e, 216-220.  
9
 Plato, The Republic, 511a-e.   
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are the essential part of any physical object, and no object can exist without its 
corresponding Form.  Forms and their objectively true status are privileged over sensory 
objects and their contingently relational status, since the Forms are the nature of anything 
that exists within the sensory world.    
Essentialism is clearly entailed from this objective understanding of Form-object 
relations.  Forms are true, and thus structure all things that appeal to them, namely 
everything within the sensory realm of existence.  The Forms are the true structure of 
reality.  Gender is essentialized through this understanding, since it human beings, or 
males and females, have essential natures.  Maleness corresponds to its established Form, 
as does femaleness.  It is not a far-reaching step to justifiably claim that males are 
privileged over females because of their essential natures.  The masculine nature obtains 
its certain properties from its Form, as does the feminine nature.  It can be justifiably 
argued that males and females are not only different, but that one is better than the other 
because of innate concepts stemming from its nature or essence.  Social and intellectual 
disempowerment is entailed since social norms can arbitrarily pick-and-chose which 
“natural” properties are to be privileged over the other, and that these properties are 
essentially true and necessary.  The only way out of this argumentation is to challenge the 
paradigm of truth and essentialism itself, which Nietzsche and James both did.  Now that 
Platonic essentialism has been discussed, it will be simple to see the intent and arguments 
that anti-essentialism challenges.          
Nietzsche rejects the idea that there is a world that is beyond the sensible, human 
world—he denies all existence of objective, intrinsic value and worth.  For Nietzsche, the 
world has no objective truth or purpose.  God’s death marks the historical and intellectual 
12 
 
moment that reality, truth, and value ceased to have essential characteristics and 
justifications. Platonism claimed that there existed a world in-itself where all objective, 
essential entities existed; Nietzscheanism, on the other hand, asserts that there is no 
existing world that is in-itself, rather all truth and purpose is grounded within the sensible 
world or human being.  All value and truth, then, is contingent upon individual or social 
creation and justification.  Reality is not fixed within an objective, essential framework.  
Reality, as Nietzsche defines it, is an interpretation of the experiential world, rather than 
something that is-in-itself.
10
  Reality is perception and conjecture on the account of 
individual or social creativity.   
With this assertion, Nietzschean thought is anti-essentialist.  Nietzsche’s 
expression that “God has died” has more implications than just the void of objectivity in 
reality; this claim has another facet.  Since objective justification and purpose has ceased 
to exist within individual conscience, individual human beings are responsible for the 
creation of value, meaning, and purpose.
11
  The Death of God, then, has two implications: 
the dismissal of objectivity and the existential responsibility for individuals to create 
themselves and their own “truths” based on individual desire.  Individuals are allotted 
radical freedom over their lives and values once binding objectivity has ceased to become 
a method for defining truth and existence.  This freedom leaves the future open for 
individuals to create themselves according to their own desired purposes.  Nietzsche 
claims that, in the aftermath of God or objectivity, individuals “shall become the masters 
over [themselves], masters also over [their] virtues…” and are, thus, responsible for 
                                                          
10
 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 19-20.  
11
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 181-182. 
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themselves and their desires.
12
 An individual’s purpose and character is discovered within 
that individual, rather than outside them.  Nietzsche thus disposes of essential entities and 
metaphysical, objective truths.  Through the thought-experiment of the Death of God, 
Nietzsche has rejected Platonic metaphysics and essentialism as a whole, and has defined 
truth and value as a social or individualistic creation; meaning, value, purpose, and reality 
are assigned, not essentially derived at from objective entities.  Nietzsche’s anti-
essentialism marked a new paradigm shift in academic philosophy, and a move towards 
an existentialist account of philosophy and intellectualism. 
Nietzsche’s “Death of God” is only one example of his anti-essentialist 
philosophy.  Nietzsche establishes an idea of an Intellectual Conscience in a number of 
his works—especially his novel Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  For Nietzsche, this 
“conscience” is the only way individuals can create their own meaning and value in the 
wake of the death of God.  What Nietzsche is describing through this idea is the drive and 
desires within an individual—their Will to Power—that forces them to introspectively 
examine and reexamine their value and choices, in accordance to their own preferences.
13
 
Nietzsche claimed that nihilism, or the state of apathy and despair in the face of the 
meaningless of existence, was simply a failure in individual desire.
14
  An individual, for 
Nietzsche, is made up of various forces of drives and desires (i.e. their Will to Power) 
which stems from their Intellectual Conscience.
15
  Nietzsche is claiming that, since there 
is no objective purpose in the world, individual beings must create their purpose from 
                                                          
12
 Friedrich Nietzsche, from “The Death of God, Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Nathan 
Oaklnader (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Publishing, 1996): 77.   
13
 Robert Pippin, “Introduction,” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, by Friedrich Nietzsche (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006): 161.  
14
 Pippin, “Introduction,” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 161-162. 
15
 Pippin, “Introduction,” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 163. 
14 
 
their own desires and preferences, which is found through a constant “checking-in” with 
oneself and one’s desires—or their Intellectual Conscience.  One’s Intellectual 
Conscience is defined, then, as the constant examination and revaluation of their desires 
and values. Nietzsche has rejected all definition of values and truths from an objective 
understanding to a social and individual construction based upon desire and preference.  
Platonic and Enlightenment thought are rejected, the current approach by social 
intellectualism has been defined as fallacious, and individual creativity has been posited 
as a means to truth and value.  Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism was groundbreaking in 
academic philosophy, for it shifted significance from an objective, essential 
understanding of truth and value, to a socio-individualistic understanding.  However, 
within the discussion of gender and gender-essentialism, Nietzsche’s anti-essentialist 
philosophy is problematic and caused problems for 19
th
 and 20
th
 century feminist 
theory.
16
 
In order to best understand Nietzsche and the contributions that he made to 
philosophy and to the later analysis of gender, it is imperative to understand Nietzsche’s 
historical context—in particular, to draw parallels from the ongoing debates of gender, 
sexuality, and intellectual discourse to Nietzsche’s work.   Nietzsche anti-essentialism 
was influencing and being influenced by specific movements of late-19
th
 century 
Germany, and these movements are a concrete example of Nietzsche’s influence on 
notions of gender.  Nietzsche was writing at the latter part of the 19
th
 century, after the 
                                                          
16
 I am familiar with the work of Kelly Oliver and Maudemarie Clark, which analyzes Nietzsche’s use of 
“woman” and misogyny and the parallels each have with truth and life-affirmation within Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. I am concerned with Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism and its success and failures regarding 
critical analyses of gender, especially relating to later gender theorists such as de Beauvoir and Butler, 
which is not analyzed under contemporary scholarship.  For a further discussion of this Nietzsche use of 
truth and life-affirmation and its gendered parallels, see Feminist Interpretations of Nietzsche.     
15 
 
Enlightenment had undermined the power of Christianity to be the most compelling 
answer and justification to a variety of philosophical and intellectual quandaries.  The 
world was now structured by a metaphysical, rationalist system of thought, and truth was 
independent of the physical world.  Germany, in this post-Enlightenment world, was 
operating under this scientific understanding of phenomenological examinations.  
Sexuality, at the turn of the 19
th
 century, was also under strict scientific analysis—
specifically the sexual sphere of individual behavior and the innate drives that this 
sexuality implied.  A wealth of intellectual rhetoric concerning sexuality appeared in 
Germany at the beginning of the 19
th
 century, which then had a tremendously significant 
effect on social and political discourse.  Sexuality determined one’s existence in society, 
since, according to the social sciences that were prominent in this period, sexuality was 
correlated with an individual behavior.  Gender, sexuality, and social “place” were 
viewed under one specific paradigm: the biological analysis.
17
 Through medical studies, 
sexuality and sexually-driven social roles were established by, and for, working systems 
of power.   
Sexuality, social order, and identity were combined into a theory of biological 
essentialism. e.g. that males and females had essential sexual, and thus character, traits 
that were tied to their biological makeup,  that shaped the political, social, and intellectual 
sphere of Germany from the early 19
th
 century until the 20
th
 century.  According to 
contemporary historiographical studies on sexuality in modern Germany, sexuality and 
its correlation to individual social existence was defined by “a set of concepts, 
institutions, and practices developed by the bourgeoisie” and thus enforced by these 
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social relations of power.
18
  Notions of sexuality and sexual practices were constructed by 
various social structures and then normalized through biological studies and the social 
and political acceptance of these constructs.  Sexuality and society were related 
interdependently, since sexuality had been conjured to determine the order of society, and 
one’s status in society was thus determined by one’s “innate” sexual drives and 
corresponding character traits—one’s sexual drives, under the interpretation of 19th 
century German intellectuals, was directly related to one’s cognitive and social 
capacities.
19
  Social intellectualism viewed the male sex drive as strong and forceful, thus 
entailing their assertiveness and independence within their given social relations.  Female 
sex drives, on the other hand, were deemed as weak and submissive, thus entailing a 
social existence of celibacy and interdependence.
20
  Sex drives were a determining factor 
of how one would behave, and what one’s situation in society ought to be, under the 
current understanding of 19
th
 century sexology.  Sexuality was a facet of individual 
identity, since it determined one’s character qualities which was said to be solely related 
to one’s biological makeup.  This led power-systems to define individuals and their place 
in the social order based upon their innate sexual drives, and based upon the definition of 
sexuality that biology conjured for specific groups of individuals.  Since sexuality was 
“elaborated by medical experts—doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, [and] sexologists,” 
as Edward Dickinson and Robert Wetzell claim, social power systems had justification 
and credible “proof” that sexuality produced innate character traits, and biological 
essentialism could then manage society in a specific manner.
21
 Thus, as a number of 
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scholars claim, power-structures adopted and enforced notions of sexuality and social 
identity and determined how individuals were situated within this construction.    
 Though gender was not specifically analyzed, per se, under this biological 
construction of identity and social structure that defined one through their innate 
biological sexuality, constructions of gender certainly derived from it.  Notions of power 
constructed sexual drives and concepts of biology to be essential to an individual’s 
character, thus essential to an individual’s social place.  Gender and sexuality, in the late-
19
th
 century, were combined into a unified definition of identity.  Sexuality and its innate, 
biological concepts defined masculinity and femininity, and their corresponding place in 
society.  Politics, economics, and social relations were determined by one’s constructed 
gender role.  Femininity became known to be passive, submissive, and “pure,” in tandem 
with “woman’s” innately weak and passive sexual drive.  If a “woman” escaped her rigid 
social or sexual classification, then she was seen as degenerate by social German society 
throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries.  An individual’s place was defined for them, 
and this place was contingent upon relations of biology, power, and sexual drives.  The 
previously established gendered binary of social order, where masculinity is privileged 
over femininity, was being reinforced by new scientific discourse and manipulated by 
systems of sociopolitical power.   
Various feminist movements in early 20
th
 century Germany began to challenge 
this notion of gender classification and oppression, and “woman’s” place inside of this 
oppressively constructed system.  Biological, innate sexual drives were the focus of 
feminist scrutiny in late 19
th
 century German intellectualism.  Feminist and social theorist 
Henriette Furth directly challenged the “unscientific” consensus of “woman’s” sexual 
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character, and challenged “woman’s” corresponding place in society.  Furth produced a 
study, with the help of various 19
th
 century biologists, that compared the sexual drives of 
male and female plants and animals, and concluded that there was no essential difference 
between them; she then related this finding to human sexuality, and exclaimed that there 
was no difference in male and female drives and sexual capacities, and, thus, no 
difference in male and female characteristics.  The place of “woman” in German 
society—the place of submissive, maternal passiveness— Furth concluded, was unjust.22 
Prior to Furth’s study, it was constructed that “woman” was tied to her sexual drive, 
which was established as lax or weak—as compared to the relentlessly strong masculine 
drive.  Furth reversed this ideology, and advocated that the sexual drive in females was 
no different than that of males, and that “woman” ought to act upon this sexual drive in 
hopes of gaining sexual and political equality, since the politics of social society were 
strongly tied to one’s social-sexual perception.  This feminist movement marked a shift in 
intellectual discourse on sexuality and social structure in Germany at the turn of the 20
th
 
century.   
In the 1870s, social-psychology produced a number of studies on the sexuality of 
“woman,” that determined, just as men, women had strong, innate desires, drives, traits, 
and women were capable of being autonomous beings in relation to these desires—but, 
were still inferior to men’s drives and traits.  The ideology that “woman” ought to be 
celibate ceased prominence with this new scientific “discovery,” and more social space 
opened for women to morally and socially act upon their sexual desires.
23
  Though this 
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study and newly established ideology helped “woman” politically and socially, it still 
maintained a fixed notion of essentialism—”woman” and “man” had essential, innate 
characteristics that were tied to their gender.  Though Furth claimed that there was no 
difference between the sexual and character qualities of masculinity and femininity, she 
maintained that there were still essential defining traits of individuals—these traits just 
were not different between men and women.  Nonetheless, there were still defining, 
essential traits within men and women, these traits were now just viewed as the same.  
Prior to Furth’s and the social-psychologists analysis, sexuality was essential to an 
individual innate character, and this version privileged men; Furth’s and social-
psychology’s analysis claimed that men and women were essentially the same, using 
biology to back their claims.  Though Furth’s analysis, along with the new analysis of 
scientific sexology of the 1870s, binaried essentialism—the idea that male sex drive, and 
thus males in general, is privileged over female sex drive—essentialism still existed in 
academic thought.  Furth failed to deny, as did the social scientists of her context, that 
any essential characteristics existed within individuals and their characters.   
Though Nietzsche details an extensive account of anti-essentialism, and 
establishes a thorough philosophical analysis regarding truth, meaning, and individual 
value and freedom, Nietzsche does not give a working analysis of gender or gender 
disempowerment.  Gender is not analyzed under Nietzsche’s anti-essentialist philosophy, 
and this philosophy is not utilized to scrutinize gender disempowerment or a gender 
binary.  Under Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism, gender disempowerment can actually be 
enforced.  Since all truth and value is based upon individual desire and preference, gender 
disempowerment—or a privileging of masculinity over femininity, as social history has 
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shown is a popular paradigm of social structure—can be argued and justified as an 
expression of an individual or social preference.  A truth of gendered-disempowerment 
can be related to the desires and wants of a given individual or group of individuals, and 
this desire can be carried out and acted upon with no condemnation or flaw within this 
individualistic understanding of truth and creation.  Since very little-to-no critical 
analysis of gender is given in Nietzsche’s work, and Nietzsche’s philosophy claims that 
the future of an individual’s existence is open for self-creation and preference, a gender 
binary and gender-disempowerment can be easily rationalized and established under 
Nietzschean anti-essentialist thought.  Though Nietzsche’s thought established a working 
counter-example to essentialism and objectivity, it did not provide gender a place in 
academic philosophy or with a method to condemn disempowerment based upon one’s 
facet of identity.  Later philosophers recognized this problem of Nietzschean anti-
essentialism, and established a new method of gender examination under anti-essentialist 
and existential frameworks. 
Philosopher William James was actively centered, as was Nietzsche, within a 
critical analysis of Platonic metaphysics, which shifted the paradigm of truth from an 
objective, metaphysical understanding to yet another subjective understanding.  James’ 
pragmatism sought to alter the conception of truth from a world beyond the physical 
sensory world, to the sensory world itself.  James was writing and criticizing two 
dogmatic forms of truth that plagued philosophy during this context, rationalism and 
empiricism.  James is primarily concerned with refuting the metaphysical structure of 
rationalism, however, he claims that under both interpretations nature is understood as 
being essentially determined by something, be it metaphysical forms that individuals can 
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understand, or some other type of objective structure that is unknowable.  Truth is 
understood in objective concepts that are discoverable by individuals, but not determined 
by them.  Nature is essentially structured in a particular way, and human beings “absorb” 
this truthful structure.
24
  According to James, understanding truth to be metaphysically 
determined is simply to “escape” the concreteness of reality.  Physical sensibility is 
reality, for James, and attempts to escape it lose all ability to engage with the physical 
reality.  Abstraction and metaphysical concepts are not an “an explanation of our 
universe, it is….a way of escape.”25 Essential and metaphysical conceptions of truth and 
nature are not, in fact, that determinate force shaping reality and sensory objects; rather, 
concepts of metaphysics and essential natures are nonexistent, and are only means of 
escaping the plurality and chaos of the physical world.  James furthers this critique by 
claiming that “the actual universe is a thing wide open, but rationalism makes systems, 
and systems must be closed…for [individuals] in the practical life, perfection is 
something far off…” which strengthens his understanding of reality as the perception of 
sensory objects.
26
  Metaphysical essentialism has no meaningful relations with concrete 
reality, as James defines it, and is thus an escape and an attempt to systematize this 
pluralistic reality. 
Truth, for James, is not determined by an existing metaphysical form; nor is 
reality determined by an essential nature that is perfect and absolute.  This is a direct 
contention with Platonism, and is thus an anti-essentialist conception of reality and truth.  
For James, truth is determined by its “practical consequences,” and not some essence 
existing beyond human experience.  Human experience is a requirement for pragmatic 
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truth, in the sense that a belief’s practical consequences and usage determines its meaning 
and status as a truth.
27
 James furthers this thought by claiming that a belief becomes a 
meaningful truth by determining “what conduct it is fitted to produce,” meaning that a 
belief’s significance is only related solely to its import and result.28  If the result is 
favored and continually practiced, then that belief becomes a synthetic truth.  Truth does 
not derive its nature from an essential, metaphysical beyond; rather, truth is subjectively 
created and practiced, and its significance is contingent upon the practical impact that 
would resolve from adopting the belief as a truth.  Metaphysical disputes, according to 
James, are meaningless—there are no practical consequences and imports that can be 
derived by holding a particular metaphysical concept, thus the concepts have no practical 
meaning.  Abstractions and things in-themselves, or essential essences, are “unlawful 
magic” which have no practical or distinguishable significance.29  Platonic essentialism is 
deconstructed, and a new, practical paradigm of truth is conceptualized under subjective 
and practical terms.  Essential properties are meaningless, and concepts and objects 
derived their significance from their practical meaning and prolonged practice. 
James further defines his conception of truth and reality, and claims that truth is 
an instrument.  James claims that mathematical and scientific “truths” are not grounded in 
metaphysical objectivity, but are simply the best human-constructions that allow 
individuals to engage and make-sense of the physical world.  Truth is instrumentally true, 
as are mathematical and scientific truths, in the fact that it allows individuals to “get into 
satisfactory relation” with the physical world, or serve as “conceptual short-cuts” that 
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enable individuals to engage their reality.
30
  Truth, again, is a synthetic practice that only 
becomes significant in its relation to its practice and the outcomes of that practice. 
Objective nature, as James argues, “is nowhere to be found” and is nonexistent under this 
anti-essentialist paradigm.
31
 Reality consists of sensory experience, and individual 
conception of these sensory experiences.  There exists no binding, objective essence that 
determines how things are.  Things are sense and understood in a plurality of way, and 
individuals adopt specific beliefs based on these experiences.  The beliefs gain 
significance when their practical consequences are significant enough to allow 
individuals to make sense of the physical world in a cohesive and efficient manner.  Truth 
and beliefs changes as new experiences emerge, thus altering the practical consequences 
of these existing truths and beliefs.  The structure of reality is simply human 
interpretation and practice, which is in constant flux as new interpretation and practice 
emerge. Truth is contingent upon its practical and useful relation to experience and the 
ability to engage with the physical world in a consistent manner; thus it is a synthetic and 
individual practice. Social meaning and values are contingent upon wide-scale practice of 
given beliefs that have particularly helpful practical effects.  Reality and meaning are 
“made true,” rather than being structurally determined that way.32 
This conception of practiced truth certainly dismantles the idea of metaphysical 
essentialism.  Essential properties are meaningless and have no practical, concrete import, 
and are only an escape from reality.  Since truth is framed a useful practice and 
interpretation of experiences, there cannot be said to exist any type of essential nature 
that binds reality or individuals.  Gender essentialism, as in the case of Nietzsche’s anti-
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essentialist thought, is dismissed on grounds of abstraction and meaninglessness.  
Essential, objective entities do not exist.  However, this conception of truth also fails to 
analyze gender and binaried social relations, and therefore enforces gender 
disempowerment.  It can easily be conceived that gender disempowerment can be a 
practiced truth with consequences that are justifiably argued to efficiently arrange social 
reactions and individual understandings of sensory reality.  Pragmatic conceptions of 
truth establish a working critique of essential natures and realities, thus any argument 
grounding disempowerment or a binary within a framework essential nature cannot hold 
to be true.  Masculinity and femininity have no natures that differentiate them or serve to 
privilege one over the other, but social reactions can discriminate against masculinity or 
femininity based on adopted and continued social practices; one gender can be provided 
over the other, not based on nature, but upon synthetic practice.  Pragmatism makes 
advances in analyzing gender, since is deconstructs essentialism, though it fails in the fact 
that it justifies disempowerment and binaries based on subjectively imposed and 
practiced truths.   
Nietzsche and James both made significant strides in an analysis of gender, by 
attacking essentialism on two different methods; however, both failed to critically engage 
gender disempowerment, and developed theories that enforced different forms of 
disempowerments based on gender and binaried social relations.  Neither challenges the 
notion of sex and gender binaries, either.  Both conceptions of anti-essentialist 
philosophy assume that there are two sexes and two genders. Thus, those who fall outside 
of the normative functions of masculinity and femininity, or male and female, are 
automatically oppressed for failure to conform to established binary of sex and gender.  
25 
 
Thus, oppression outside of essentialism is justified and oppression based on binaried sex 
and gender is entailed.  Later theorists will recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the 
anti-essentialist conception of truth and meaning, and will work to synthesize its failings 
in extensively analyzing gender and disempowerment, but also use its core arguments as 
the foundation to their theories. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DE BEAUVOIR AND THE HISTORICAL SITUATION 
 
 
Working nearly half a century later, French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir 
utilized the framework of Nietzsche’s and James’ anti-essentialism as well as 19th and 
early-20
th
 century social theory.  De Beauvoir’s groundbreaking work, The Second Sex, 
published in 1949, sought to formulate a new analysis on gender and power, taking the 
shortcomings of the social feminists, intellectuals, and philosophers of 19
th
 and mid-20th 
century and creating a new synthesis to analyze gender and “woman’s” “Otherness” in 
modern French society.  Feminist theory, prior to de Beauvoir, was still immersed within 
the Nietzschean inspired scientific and psychological discourse of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
century social theory, coming out of Germany.  Nominalism was the prominent feminist 
theory of 20
th
 century France, which concluded, as did German social theory, that “man” 
and “woman” were essentially the same.  The socio-political situation of “woman” was 
bettered by such theories, but no more progress was made from the feminist movement of 
early-20
th
 century Germany, which primarily equalized the sexual drives of “man” and 
“woman”, and gave “woman” more opportunity and choice to act upon those sex drives.  
De Beauvoir claimed that this understanding of sexuality and gender—two terms that 
prior feminism would have treated synonymously—was flawed, and did nothing to 
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critically analyze gender or the gendered structure of social politics and individual 
choice and freedom.
33
        
De Beauvoir’s analysis focused on the socio-historical situation of femininity, 
rather than assigning “woman” specific characteristics and arguing for the political and 
social equality of those individuals, as prior feminists had done.  De Beauvoir shifted the 
paradigm of gender analysis in a new direction, one that analyzed notions of power and 
identity from a phenomenological and social-constructivist standpoint.  This new theory 
of gender focused more on deconstructing the phenomenon of gender and gender roles 
within a certain historical situation, while separating gender and sex as two distinct 
phenomena, as opposed to examining sex and gender within the framework of socio-
political advancement.  De Beauvoir’s theory was a robust paradigm shift to a 
philosophical analysis of gender within a specific individual and social situation, and this 
challenged all preconceived notions of gender, power, essentialism, and conceptions of 
identity.  Feminist theory now had an entirely new and distinct paradigm, which was 
based upon the work that prior anti-essentialists and feminist had established.       
De Beauvoir wrote in a particular context that enabled her to make various claims 
and arguments on gender, individual situations, and sexuality.  France—coming out of 
the Second World War, and being immersed in the intellectual rhetoric of existentialism, 
pluralism, liberalism, anti-essentialism, as well as other radical theories—was 
conveniently situated for groundbreaking analytical work on the social-sciences, 
individualism, human psychology, and responsibility.
34
  These new intellectual 
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movements in French society, and the state of France after the moral and physical 
destruction of Second World War, allowed for new debates and angles on a variety of 
topics, and established a foundation for various thinkers to establish new ideas and 
analyses in a variety of fields.  A critical and philosophical analysis of gendered society 
emerged.     
De Beauvoir’s socio-historical context, just as her work focuses on, served as a 
helpful context and source of inspiration for her work and radical ideas.  In this section, I 
seek to contextualize de Beauvoir in a given historical and intellectual situation.  First, I 
will examine de Beauvoir’s feminist theory in light of mid-20th century French social, 
intellectual, and political society, in order to give context to de Beauvoir’s thought, and to 
display the progression of feminist and social theory that emerged in Europe from 
Nietzschean anti-essentialism.  Second, I will analyze de Beauvoir through a transmission 
of intellectual ideas such as Platonism, anti-essentialism, and existentialism to detail de 
Beauvoir’s theory, and how this theory was a synthesis of these branches of thought.  
Last, I will conclude that de Beauvoir’s analysis on individual situations was a new and 
unique angle on prior feminist and philosophical theory, thus sparking a new wave of 
gender analysis and field of academic philosophy; a critical analysis of conceptions of 
gender and gender disempowerment.   
I complicate recent scholarship that explores de Beauvoir’s work within its 
intellectual community, regarding Freudian psychoanalysis or American radical 
feminism, and I situate de Beauvoir more deeply within French postwar intellectualism.
35
  
The situation of France after the Second World War is essential to contextualizing de 
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Beauvoir through a philosophical and historical understanding.  Historian Judith Coffin 
undertook this task in her work “Historicizing the Second Sex;” my work enriches this 
insightful and extensive analysis, by relating de Beauvoir’s ideas within a larger 
transmission of ideas regarding gender and academic philosophy.   
De Beauvoir, in her introduction to The Second Sex, expresses her impatience 
with the existing feminist and social theories of modern France.  According to de 
Beauvoir, “enough ink has flooded over the quarrel about feminism...and the volumes of 
idiocies churned out over this past century do not seem to have clarified the problem.”36 
Nominalism, which asserted that men and women were, in most senses, the same, was the 
most prominent feminist theory of mid-century France.  Social-science had moved from 
the 19
th
 century understanding of essential differences within “man” and “woman,” to a 
more liberal theory of gendered existence: that there were no properties that differentiated 
the two, and that each were essentially the same.  “Man” and “woman” were both labeled 
“human being.”  De Beauvoir criticizes this view, claiming that it was too trivial and 
abstract: “Nominalism is a doctrine that falls a bit short...clearly, no ‘woman’ can claim 
without bad faith to be situated beyond her sex.”37 The theory was trivial because, 
according to de Beauvoir, every individual is a human being; the theory added nothing to 
the analysis of gender disempowerment.
38
  
Nominalism is too abstract to have any political or intellectual import for de 
Beauvoir, because though both men and women may be human beings, there are specific 
social distinctions and inequalities that separate them, e.g. the binaried society that 
privileges men over women.   De Beauvoir’s claim is that feminist theory fails to 
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examine gender in the correct way.  For de Beauvoir, an individual’s gender identity is a 
facet of their existence, and that this facet is inescapable.  To identify both “man” and 
“woman” as a human being and nothing more would be to separate an individual from 
their sex and gender identity.  In order to properly analyze gender, then, one must 
examine what grounds gender identity, and, for de Beauvoir, this is an individual’s socio-
historical situation.
39
 With this new analysis, de Beauvoir articulated a new direction 
within feminist theory, and moved gender into the scope of academic philosophy, 
surpassing existing feminist theories and their platforms of analysis.    
De Beauvoir did not stop at critiquing French feminist theory of the mid-20th 
century.  Rather, de Beauvoir’s work criticized, analyzed, and synthesized a variety of 
aspects of French intellectual culture.  In the aftermath of the Second World War, 
intellectual and public discourse published a number of works on ethics, humanism, 
liberalism, Marxism, and a variety of others.  However, the French intellectual and public 
spheres were not particularly interested in analyzing “woman’s” liberation movements, or 
gender as a whole.  Feminism, as de Beauvoir’s intellectual colleagues would have 
claimed, had already been given a sufficient analysis; the issue of feminism was over.
40
 
After the Second World War, the French public sphere was focused on establishing a 
unifying morality and enforcing normative ethical codes.  Literature, philosophy, social-
psychology, and other academic disciples were expected to produce work that matched 
up with this established moral code.
41
  This meant that French society had repressed—or, 
at least, confined—sexuality, and the discussion of it, to the private sphere.   
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Unlike Germany in the 19
th
 century, amid anxiety and social reformation after the 
Second World War, talk of sexuality was eliminated within intellectual and social 
discourse, and lost significance in the social and political order, as well as its prominence 
in intellectual studies.  According to Coffin, “simply to speak of the ‘sexual’--and to 
insist that it was important or necessary to do so—was to reduce and debase the human; it 
represented the surrender of civilization of the individual to the dark forces of 
sexuality…”42 French culture was attempting to recover from the atrocities of the Second 
World War by alienating immoral discussion in public and academic settings, which 
included any discussion of sexuality and gender.  Feminist theories in mid-century 
France, primarily, focused on pacifism and political advancement; de Beauvoir’s analysis 
shifted this paradigm and created feminist theory anew.   
In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir asserts that “one is not born, but rather becomes, 
‘woman’.  No biological, psychic, or economic destiny defines the figure that the human 
female takes on in society; it is civilization as a whole that elaborates this...” which serves 
as the underlying claim to her intellectual analysis of gender: tropes of gender are socially 
defined for by structures of power and privilege, and adopted and personified by specific 
individuals.
43
 De Beauvoir’s analysis, then, claims that an individual's socio-historical 
situation defines their identity and existence.  Gender, for de Beauvoir, is an entity that is 
placed on a sexed body.  Gender is a socially-created trope, and conceptions of gender 
are particularly binaried; the masculine nature is far more socially privileged than the 
feminine nature, and this phenomenon is contingent upon sociopolitical understandings 
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of gender and value, relative to a particular context.
44
  “Woman” in mid-century France, 
according to de Beauvoir, is posited as the “Other;” something systematically different 
than the dominant, privileged masculine gender.  For de Beauvoir, French society 
privileges masculinity as “right by virtue of being a man.”45 She also claims that 
“humanity is male, and man defines “woman”, not in herself, but in relation to himself.  
She is not considered an autonomous being.”46 Conceptions of gender and identity are 
defined in relation to the values and ideologies of a particular society; those with social 
privilege and power, however, possess the ability to create and enforce conception of 
gender.  Thus, “woman’s” situation is created by power and privilege, relative to a 
particular social context.  
Gender, for de Beauvoir, is not a Platonic ideal that is.  Rather, gender is a social-
construction, based upon the ideologies and privileges of a given socio-historical 
situation.
47
  In mid-century French society, as de Beauvoir claims, “woman” is the 
“Other,” the inferior, or the submissive.  Men “have better jobs, higher wages, and 
greater chances to succeed than their female competitors; they occupy many more places 
in industry, in politics, and so forth…”48 French society is dominated by male privilege, 
and this privilege creates the social-situation of “woman”.  Throughout historical 
discourse, “woman’s” subordination has been normalized by a society dominated by male 
privilege.  “Lawmakers, priests, philosophers, writers, and scholars,” de Beauvoir claims, 
“have gone to great lengths to prove that women’s subordinate condition was willed in 
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heaven and profitable on Earth.”49 De Beauvoir’s claim reiterates her idea that gender is 
created and assigned through social and political discourse.  Gender is a social 
phenomenon, and individual identity is contingent upon a set of circumstances pertaining 
to their situation.  Identity, choice, and freedom are limited.  Only those that are 
privileged are able to seek any sort of transcendent freedom from their gendered 
situation, while, also, creating and enforcing situations for those less privileged. 
Social and political relations are separated into two categories, and two classes of 
individuals are defined through the current sociopolitical context of France.  According to 
de Beauvoir, “the division of humanity into two categories of individuals…is a static 
myth.”50 Through this division of classes, one set of individuals, “man,” is defined 
through reality and has power over ones conception of identity.  The other class, 
“woman,” is defined through a “transcendent ideal,” or a fixed stereotype, where no 
control over identity is possible because it is defined as an absolute entity that escapes 
beyond all physical interpretation.
51
  Thus, “woman” is fixed, defined, and limited while 
“man” is free to create and define; the Eternal Feminine is formed from this social 
division, which defines “woman” as a trope based on a specific set of pejorative 
characteristics.  De Beauvoir complicates this division and trope by claiming that “it is 
obviously not reality that dictates to society or individuals their choices between the two 
opposing principles of unification; in ever period, in every case, society and individuals 
decide according to their needs.”52 Here, de Beauvoir is claiming that the idea of 
“woman” is merely a series of characteristics and definitions that binds identity, and that 
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this trope is created by a given society or set of individuals in order to enforce power and 
advance interest.  Social relations solidify this trope through a widely accepted practice, 
which individuals and institutions accept, enforce, and center operations on.  This 
conjured ideal is widely adopted and practiced by a particular context, through relations 
of power and privilege who create and enforce it, and is also personified and adopted by 
individuals whom are defined by the trope itself.
53
 Or, the idea of “woman” is “effected 
by patriarchal society for the end of self-justification…this society imposed its laws and 
customs on individuals in an imagistic and sensible way.”54 This trope, then, is falsely 
justified through an absolute, metaphysical concept that does not exists, and is thus 
falsely imposed by structures of power and privilege which define concrete reality and 
social norms.         
According to de Beauvoir, “when [an individual] is offered no goal, or is 
prevented from reaching any goal, or denied victory of it, [their] transcendence, falls 
uselessly into the past…this is the lot assigned to women in patriarchy.”55 The trope of 
“woman” takes away any type of freedom “woman” has to create and define itself, and 
thus traps “woman” within the definition that is defined for it.  Rather than allowing 
“woman” to create itself through choices and values, “woman” is forced to comply with a 
rigid stereotype that is justified by a platonic nature, which is defined by power systems 
of privilege based on the self-interest of a given socio-historical context.                 
De Beauvoir is concerned with dismantling Platonism and essentialist tropes of 
identity and truth, just as Nietzsche and James were; thus, de Beauvoir is operating under 
an anti-essentialist paradigm of thought.  However, de Beauvoir’s new paradigm 
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incorporates anti-essentialist arguments to analyze conceptions of gender and power.  
Since gender, for de Beauvoir, is a synthetic identity that is created by a given society and 
placed onto individuals, de Beauvoir is using an anti-essentialist idea in a way that 
includes gender.  Since, under this paradigm, truth has no objective grounding, but is 
created and practiced by individual beings, gender is analyzed in the same method.  
Gender has no essential traits; rather, it is constructed by and contingent upon a given 
socio-historical situation.  Gender and sexuality, then, have no specific or essential 
essence and definition, thus both phenomena are constructed.  This new synthesis takes 
claims from Nietzschean and Jamesean anti-essentialism, and analyzes gender while 
scrutinizing power systems and privilege for creating the imminent situation of particular 
individuals.  Gender as an essential definition of one’s existence is dissected to become a 
social construct the time, relative to an individual’s situation.   
  De Beauvoir’s examination of gender also took place within, and extended, the 
newly established intellectual movement of existentialism.  For de Beauvoir, one’s 
gender identity is a part of their being; or, as existentialists would call it, their facticity.  
Existentialists separate being into two categories: being as facticity—which is defined as 
uncontrollable factors of one’s existence such as one’s sex, race, or family genealogy—
and being as transcendence—which is defined as the ability to shape one’s existence, 
actively, in accordance to their own self-interest and value.  These two entities are 
intricately intertwined, and one must be both of them at the same time to escape being in 
bad faith, or a faulty, deceptive existence.
56
 An individual, to the existentialist, is not pure 
facticity nor pure transcendence.  Nietzsche’s and James’ philosophy clearly established a 
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groundwork for the existentialists since subjective value and truth are the foundation of 
the theory, and the future for individuals, under anti-essentialist thought, is open to 
create.  French existentialists were concerned with examining individual responsibility, 
value, and freedom—a focus fitting for postwar France—but neither were concerned with 
the analysis of gender.  As part of the existentialist movement, though, de Beauvoir 
extended the debates of existentialism to include a consideration of gender within its 
framework.  
De Beauvoir’s work incorporates existentialism and anti-essentialism to evaluate 
gender situations.  De Beauvoir claims that, “every time transcendence lapses into 
immanence, there is a degradation of existence into ‘in-itself,’ of freedom into 
facticity…” which grounds her thought in existentialist ideology.57  De Beauvoir adds to 
the prior claim by stating “[but] what singularly defines the situation of “woman” is that 
being, like all humans, an autonomous freedom, she discovers and chooses herself in a 
world where men force her to assume herself as Other; an attempt is made to freeze her 
as an object and doom her to immanence…”58 According to de Beauvoir’s claim, the 
situation of “woman” in this given socio-historical situation, is not chosen by individuals, 
it is assigned.  Being of transcendence succumbs to being of facticity: choice is limited, 
and even thwarted, by the situation.  In this sense, de Beauvoir utilizes and restructures 
the philosophies of anti-essentialism and existentialism to examine gender and individual 
situations, and utilizes each theory to critically analyze gender and social structures of 
power within a given historical context.       
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Utilizing a philosophical paradigm, de Beauvoir synthesizes arguments and ideas 
from feminist theory, anti-essentialism, and existentialism to develop a critical 
philosophical analysis of gender and gender-disempowerment; something that feminist 
theory, philosophy, and French intellectualism prior to de Beauvoir had failed to do.  De 
Beauvoir is, as many scholars claim, the shift into Second Wave feminism, challenging 
various other theories to examine the social, economic, and historical situation of 
individuals to determine their status in society.  Rather than existing under a moralized 
framework, or premise that there was no difference in “man” and “woman”—while, 
simultaneously denying the blatant difference between the sexes in the social-sphere—
and situating individuals beyond their sex, de Beauvoir framed her analysis differently, 
examining the correlation of gender identity, choice, and social power structures.  Not 
only did de Beauvoir falsify traditional and social theories of French intellectual and 
feminist thought, breaking ground in a new method of feminist and social theory, she also 
expanded the philosophical discipline to include the critical analysis of the relations of 
gender and power. 
De Beauvoir is situated within a paradigm of anti-essentialist thought that is 
attempting to restructure the focus or truth and nature from platonic metaphysics to a 
socially imposed understating.  De Beauvoir’s conception of the trope of “woman” is 
justified by appealing to a metaphysical form, just as platonic metaphysics is.  This form 
then defines social relations and concrete reality.  However, de Beauvoir understands of 
this trope as being a socially imposed reality, which is contingent upon values and 
ideologies of a particular context, and thus presents an anti-essentialist argument.  
“Woman,” nor “man,” is essentially anything other than the values defined by a given 
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social power structure and the choice of the agent to define themselves according to 
values.  However, only allowing those whom are socially privileged are able to actively 
define and create themselves and the privileged values of a social context, while limiting 
those not privileged by the social system to an imposed and inescapable definition of 
character.  De Beauvoir’s conception of power as a subversive social operation further 
defines anti-essentialism, and this usage analyzes and critiques notions of gender and 
disempowerment and defines gender as a socially-imposed value that is widely practiced 
and enforced.   
Though de Beauvoir offers a critically engaging critique of the situation of 
“woman,” her arguments fails to be exhaustive.  De Beauvoir understands individuals 
defined in relation to the privileged and practiced values of a given social context.  Social 
power allows individuals the autonomy to actively choose the values and identity tropes 
for themselves, which thus defines the values of a given context.  However, those not 
recognized by social power are defied in relation to those who are, and are thus 
prohibited autonomy and individuality, and are inescapably defined as “Other.”  
Historically, “woman” has been defined in relation to “man” and thus as a social 
otherness.  Masculinity exists as a socially privileged and socially mobile identify trope, 
where femininity is defined only in its difference to masculinity.  Though individuals 
have a sense of autonomy to choose to become feminine or masculine, social power 
prohibits the feminine from this choice, and devalues the identify trope altogether.  De 
Beauvoir seems to be advocating for the autonomy of the feminine, and a feminist 
critique of the social power that defines and privileges to become more egalitarian and 
accessible.   
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This, at first, seems emancipating.  However, de Beauvoir fails to excuse her 
analysis of all types of oppression.  De Beauvoir, by only understanding sex as being 
defined in terms of male or female and gender as being defied in terms of masculinity and 
femininity, is operating within a gender binary, and excludes those who do not conform 
to either sex or gender; it fails to allow any type of freedom or autonomy outside of the 
traditional binaried understanding of sex and gender.  De Beauvoir also defines “woman” 
as essentially related to “man” or the privileged social values and identity trope of a 
context, and thus offers a universalized understanding of “woman.”  De Beauvoir defines 
“woman” as unified which shares a common conception of being defined as “Other” in 
relation to “man” and is offered no autonomy and individuality by the existing social 
power system.  This is problematic because it fails to exhaust the term of “woman,” and 
creates a false universal trope that ignores differences in class, race, sexual orientation, 
and so on and the different types of oppression that are associated with these differences 
in identity, which are all included within the term “woman.” Thus, de Beauvoir’s analysis 
fails to be exhaustive in understanding “woman”, and actually entails various forms of 
oppression, essentialism, and binaried social relations.                  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
BUTLER AND ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM 
 
 
“The Master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”59 
Judith Butler recognized, in de Beauvoir’s and the prior anti-essentialists work, 
the potential to entail various forms of oppression while advocating for equity.  Butler 
rejects the conception of gender and feminist ideology of “second wave” feminism, 
particularly that of understanding “woman” as a universalized identify concept that all 
who identify as “woman” share in, and operating under a binaried understanding of sex 
and gender.
60
 In this section, I will examine Butler’s claims against feminist theory 
particularly that of “second wave” and Beauvoir’s theory of gender theory, and how this 
framework of feminist theory entails oppression in its effort to dismantle oppression.  
Primarily, how prior feminist theory and de Beauvoir’s anti-essentialist theory of gender 
defined “woman” in universal and binding terms for purposes of recognition and 
emancipation.  However, Butler claims this foundational approach, using “woman” as the 
foundation of feminist politics, essentializes “woman” into a unified definition of value, 
class, sexuality, and oppression.  More specifically, this approach assumes that “woman” 
is defined under a white, straight, middle-class definition, since this trope of “woman” 
has been privileged in most socio-historical contexts. Feminism, therefore, excludes 
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various individuals who cannot be defined under this privileged and limited 
definition.  In the following work, I first examine the paradox of emancipation that Butler 
charges feminist theory with.  Second, I examine the pejorative implications that Butler 
details regarding universal identity, and how this conception entails oppression.  Third, I 
will examine Butler’s refutation of a gender binary and her understanding of the 
relationship of gender, sex, and power production.  Finally, I will conclude that Butler 
offers an alternate critique of gender disempowerment and power, which highlights 
elements of anti-essentialism through its anti-foundational approach.  Since Butler rejects 
foundational definitions of gender, I conclude, her work is anti-essentialist.  Under this 
approach, gender has no essential characteristics that define it.  Since gender has no 
essential characteristics or foundations and cannot be defined in one specific way with 
specific traits, Butler’s project challenges traditional tropes of masculinity and femininity 
that have unreachable criterion, while allowing gender theory to be more inclusive in its 
approach.     
 Butler claims, in her work Gender Trouble, that “feminist theory has assumed that 
there is some existing identity understood through the category of woman.”61 For 
emancipatory purposes, a unified identity of “woman” seems necessary and essential.  
One must present a common identity or group to be recognized within a political 
structure.  In order to make appeals for political advancement, a group or individual must 
define some sort of identity that is publically recognizable.  “Woman,” as Butler claims, 
has historically not be recognized as autonomous or even recognized as an existing 
identity at all, and thus feminist theory has formed a type of unity and definition in order 
to create a subject of “woman,” a subject for feminism, and a subject for political 
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recognition and advancement.
62
 De Beauvoir advanced this type of understanding, by 
defining “woman” as something that universally is.  Representation and unification 
defines “woman” as essentially something, and creates a subject that can be socio-
politically recognized as deserving of various rights and mobility.  However, Butler 
rightly recognizes that this form of unification is flawed for a number of reasons.  “If one 
is a ‘woman,’” Butler claims, “that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be 
exhaustive…”63  
Gender and gendered categories of identity, such as “woman,” fail to account for 
cross-cultural and historical contexts where gender is defined and practiced in different 
way than others.  Also, assuming there is one subject of “woman” assumes that there is 
only one voice of “woman,” one common mode of oppression, and one common set of 
values and lifestyle.
64
  Emancipation, if received from a sociopolitical power structure, 
would only allow for emancipation from one specific gender classification.  Though there 
are a number of different desires that are not determined by binaried categories, cultural 
and historical contexts, and value systems that gender categories can take on, e.g. 
differences in race, class, sexual orientation, and the like, a universal “voice” of feminism 
fails to account for these differences, and simply combines difference into a unified, 
superficial definition of “womanhood” in order to benefit and emancipate a select few 
members of the inflated subject.  Feminism operates under a paradoxical system of 
emancipation, since it attempts to liberate “woman’s” oppression by oppressing various 
differences of “woman.”65  Feminism therefore becomes a power structure that 
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subjugates and oppresses various individuals and lifestyles within socio-historical and 
sociocultural contexts.  Representation and systems of oppression for a woman of color 
or a lesbian woman will be much different than representation and systems of oppression 
for, say, a straight, middle-class white woman.  In order to avoid acting as a regulatory 
and oppressive system of power, the language and “objective” of feminism must cease 
creating universalized claims for common representation. 
With this understanding of power and representation, Butler’s project 
problematizes the very idea of emancipation within feminist theory.  According to Butler 
and French poststructuralists like Michel Foucault, political and regulatory power 
systems are, in fact, the reasons for forms of subjugation in the first place.
66
 According to 
Butler, subjects under the control of a sociopolitical structure of power, which is defined 
as legal, institutional, and linguistic operations, are “regulated by such structures, by 
virtue of being subjected to them, [and] formed, defines, and reproduced in accordance 
with the requirements of those structures.”67 Thus, political operations, legal operations, 
and linguistic limitations, e.g. how discourse defines and communicates concepts and 
identities, produce and define subjects and their situations according to the limits and 
methods established by the structure of power itself.  Feminist theory that appeals to this 
structure will be self-defeating, Butler claims, because this structure is the reason for their 
situation and subjugation.  Production and representational politics conceals its structural 
and production power by law and institutions which claim to represent individuals while 
but simultaneously produce them and their situations.
68
 The ideology and methods that 
support the political structure and regulate individual identities and situations are justified 
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through “naturalized” laws which constitute individuals as subjects under the power of 
that law.  Thus, when feminist theory appeals to a political power structure, it is operating 
under a self-defeating methodology; it uses the exact same oppressive and exclusionary 
tools as the power structure that oppresses it.  With universalizing and essentialist 
foundations, feminism becomes an oppressive and coercive power structure that defines 
“woman” only by a privileged monolith.  
In short, when feminism defines “woman” through linguistic means as a unified 
category, it is acting as a regulatory power structure that oppressively produces subjects 
and situations; the category is itself oppressive, and thus the failure to understand 
differences in the subjects that it is claiming to represent, feminism actually creates an 
oppressive and faux situation for various members under the subject definition.  
Foundational feminist politics, which attempts to focus on a foundation of “woman” and 
the subject of “woman,” becomes the source of oppressive power that it is attempting to 
deconstruct.
69
  An anti-foundationalist account of feminism, therefore, can achieve 
critical emancipation from subjected oppression.  De Beauvoir and prior feminist theory 
failed to recognize this flaw.  
Butler’s work exposes how essentialist notions of identity serve to subjugate 
various individuals to the established system of oppressive power.  However, in order to 
be fully inclusive, this understanding must actively challenge the notion of the sex/gender 
binary, lest it continue to oppress various “subjects” who fail to conform to the mode of 
operation that the structure of power has established.  Butler understands structures of 
power to create and naturalize conceptions of sex and gender, and the legal and social 
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means in which is upholds these rigid conceptions.
70
  However, Butler understands 
structures of power as operations that create two rigid categories of sex based on the 
created two categories of gender; thus, the sex/gender binary.
71
 Structures of power 
intend to situate social relations upon a “heterosexual matrix” where specific modes of 
behavior are regulated and prohibited, and situations are created through this regulation 
and prohibition.  Sociopolitical power, therefore, intends to situate society under the 
paradigm of normative heterosexuality, where two specific genders are needed to form a 
contrast.
72
 Gender categories are established and imposed by various structures of 
political and social power.  Two categories are established with corresponding behavioral 
characteristics, with each gender category opposing the other.  This strategic creation by 
sociopolitical power yields rigid classification of individuals, and regulates behavior, 
identity, and desire.  Gender is a socially constructed classification that made to seem 
normal and natural behaviors structures of power, in order to maintain the “heterosexual 
matrix.” A gender binary is constructed in order to enforce and normalize desire, sex, and 
social relations under a specific intent; that is, to regulate social heterosexuality and 
structure social relations, sex, and gender within heteronormative standards.  This 
understanding deflates the rigid and binding nature of masculinity and femininity, making 
each out to be created and enforced tropes.  Gender becomes less structured or abstract, 
and is understood within the context of normative and coercive power.      
Gender, as Butler defines it, controls and regulates biological discourse of sex, 
and conceptions of sex.  If only two rigid genders exist, then two corresponding rigid 
sexes exist.  Butler claims that the “‘truth of sex’…is produced princely through the 
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regulatory practices that generate coherent through the major coherent gender norms.  
The heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the production of discrete 
asymmetrical opposition…”73 Operating under the power of the heterosexual matrix as 
defined and enforced though the regulative practices of a power structure, a gender binary 
is formed to produce and regulate normative functions.  Gender, then, defines sex, and 
produces specific situations that advance a particular social end.  Gender, sexual desire, 
and sex categories are produced by various structures of power that regulate all social 
relations.  Thus, any individual who fails to adhere to these superficially created tropes of 
identity and orientation fails to be accepted, or even recognized, by social relations.  
Rigid forms of masculinity and femininity, with the corresponding behavior and character 
traits that oppose one another which have been established by the sociopolitical power 
source, are forced upon individual to conform to their corresponding identity.  This 
ordering of gender and sex defines discourse, language, and social operations.  If a sexed 
body fails to conform to define itself to its corresponding gender-related identity, that 
body is unrecognizable and thus excluded within the structure of social relations.
74
   
According to Butler, “identity is assured through the stabilizing concepts of sex, 
gender, and sexuality…the person is called into question by the cultural emergence of 
those ‘incoherent…’ who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility 
by which persons are formed.”75 In short, those who fail to conform to the regulative 
understanding of sex, gender, or orientation will be unintelligible under the paradigm 
established by the current sociopolitical structure.  Tropes of masculinity and femininity, 
then, have absolute power of individual identities through structured and rigid standards.  
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Thus, the sex/gender binary is superficially created in order to produce a specific end, 
which is the regulation of society under the heterosexual and heteronormative standards 
as produced by systems of political and social power.  These conceptions dominate social 
ideology and discourse, and any paradigm outside of this specific order is deviant and 
socially and/or linguistically incomprehensible.  The gender binary is thus a regulatory 
tool of a dominant power structure.  Gender is used as a regulatory means of control in 
which power structures situate sex and desire in order to define a particular paradigm of 
social and individual operations.  Gender controls notions of sex, discourse, and 
intelligibility.  Thus, the gender binary proves to be a false category established by 
oppressive power sources, and essentialist understandings of “woman” not only oppress 
“woman,” but enforce the binary and heteronormativity that the system of oppressive 
power has established.  In order for feminist theory to avoid utilizing oppressive 
functions that are implied in the foundation of “woman,” it should abstain from 
foundational and essentialist definitions of gender and instead deflate gender and 
heterosexual norms as mere tactics of control imposed by oppressive politics.  According 
to Butler, “juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field 
of power; hence there is no position outside this field;” therefore, for feminist theory to 
avoid becoming an, or at the very least utilizing the means of, the contemporary field of 
power, it’s goal should work towards an understanding “genealogy of its own 
legitimating practice” in order to authentically critique and undermine the field of 
power.
76
  This geology will yield subversive results within the framework established by 
contemporary power.  Gender and sexed categories can be deflated and defined as 
superficial concepts used to regulate social relations to suit a heterosexual privileged 
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ideal.  Feminism can also avoid utilizing the same tactics that coercive power utilizes, 
e.g. essentializing a unified but white and privileged voice of feminism and excluding 
others who fail to meet this definition while giving power to the conception of gender it is 
trying to dismantle, and subsequently becoming a linguistic and political power structure 
that defines subjects through coercive means.       
This conception of gender and sex escapes the oppressive paradoxical nature of 
feminist politics prior to “third wave” feminism and queer theory.  Butler’s conception of 
gender and critique of identity avoids operating under essentialist notions of unity, which 
includes differences in the identity of “woman” to account for race, class, sexuality, and 
so on.  Sex and gender are not limited by two rigid categories; these categories are 
defined and concealed by structures of power in order to regulate individuals and 
individual desires, and are defined as binaried to form sexual and gendered opposition.  
Thus, Butler offers the most inclusive and critical conception of gender and identity 
among the anti-essentialists and de Beauvoir, though the critique is limited to operate 
within the inescapable oppressive and ubiquitous nature of power.  Rigid definitions of 
masculinity and femininity are challenged and deconstructed as means of situating and 
classifying individuals towards the end of heteronormative sexual standards.  
Heteronormative standards are therefore defined as the coercive and regulative means 
implored by oppressive power, and gender categories and binaries are the means to 
achieve these standards.  Individuals are now able to have some, though limited, 
autonomy and choice of gender or desire since standards of gender, sex, and desire are no 
longer understood as totalizing and solidified.      
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Plato’s essentialist understanding of truth, nature, and value dominated 
philosophical discourse and justified gender disempowerment and social gender binaries.  
Since, according to Plato, all physical objects, including the values or identities that 
individuals hold, are defined by a metaphysical and overarching Form, all physical 
objects are said to have essentially defining natures.  Thus, any form of truth and value 
will be defined by a definite Form that is supported by a metaphysical concept.  Entities 
within the physical realm are simply mere copies that derive meaning and essence from 
the corresponding Form that defines.  It is clear, then, that gender essentialism and a 
gender binary is entailed and supported by this conception of reality and objective truth.  
Essential natures, maleness and femaleness, are Forms that exist metaphysically, and are 
thus discovered by individuals.  The Form of maleness thus establishes a rigid form of 
behavior, value, and character traits that are supported through the Form of male.  Thus, 
any individual possessing these qualities is defined as a male by the corresponding Form 
of male.  The same holds for femaleness.  A given historical context can justify gender 
disempowerment from this ideology by simply privileging the “truth” of masculinity over 
femininity, or vice versa—though, historically, the former precedes the latter in almost 
every case. 
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 Any such arguments that wish to argue against gender oppression or a binary that 
privileges one or the other conceptions of gender and sex must operate under an anti-
essentialist argument.  The conception of truth, meaning, and value being essentially part 
of an object or individual must cease to have any grounding.  Simply stating that, in terms 
of a binaried social-structure, that “woman” ought to be, or actually is, more privileged 
that “man” is still using essentialist notions to ground claims.  Under this paradigm, the 
privileging of one sex or gender over the other is meaningless, and can be argued for the 
same justifications on either side.  Both sexes and genders are grounded within 
essentialized natures that derive truth and meaning from a metaphysical Form.  Thus, in 
order to escape such a conception of gender and sex, and to dismantle social binaries and 
stereotyped oppression, essentialist arguments must be show to be false, or operating 
under false assumptions and justifications.  Only then will a feminist critique of 
oppression, binaries, and power be able to be successfully and inclusively achieved.  
 Nietzsche and James, I argued, successfully altered the paradigm of truth and 
value from essentialist to anti-essentialist framework.  Nietzsche’s understanding of truth 
is exemplified in his provocative thought experiment “the death of God,” where God 
symbolizes objectively and universally established “truth” and objective value.  Rather 
than existing outside of human interpretation and control, truth and value are human 
constructs, established by individuals or groups of individuals, in the case of social truths, 
to assign meaning and significance to existence, based on individual desires and the 
desire to achieve power and control over one’s life and life-choices.  Nietzsche 
understands individuals as possessing a strong and constant flux of desire, and having an 
internal conscience that wants to act upon these desires.  Since God and objectivity have 
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ceased to ground truth, value, and choice, the individual and individual desires are the 
only authentic meaning-and-value-makers.  One is constantly driven by an internal “will 
to power,” that forces individual to create meaning and adopt values, only to create more 
meaning and adopt more values in order to satisfy their internal driving forces.   
 James’ conception of truth and value, as I have presented it, operates under the 
same framework as Nietzsche’s.  For James, as with Nietzsche, truth and value are not 
essentially defied objective concepts that exist beyond individual interpretation and 
creation.  Rather, individuals or a collection of individuals form conceptions of truth 
based upon practical consequences; or, simply, what is accomplished by establishing a 
particular idea, or what would be the consequences of not adopting an idea.  If, as an 
individual or a social consensus, an idea or concept is adopted and continually practiced 
because of its practical consequences, then that idea or concept is solidified as an adopted 
or imposed truth based on continual and wide-spread practice and acceptance.  Truth is 
not given significance because of its corresponding Form, as with Plato, nor is it solely 
based upon individual or collective desires and the means to achieve these desires, but 
truth is adopted because of its import with individuals engaging and conceptualizing the 
world.  If a concept does not aid individuals in understanding the world, fails to be 
continually practiced, or another idea would have better practical consequences if it were 
practiced, then that concept is not practical and is thus not imposed as truth.  
Mathematics, therefore, is not grounded in objective mathematical concepts that are 
continually discovered by individuals, but are rather created and practiced by individuals 
because the concepts practical import in engaging and understanding the world.  The 
same is true for value.  Values are accepted and established for the practical consequence 
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of accepting that said value, and the values continued practice.  Meaning and truth are 
imposed on society and individual life rather than defined by it.   
 Intuitively, this seems to be emancipatory and groundbreaking for feminist theory 
within the context of critiquing oppression and disempowerment.  The anti-essentialism 
from James and Nietzsche is, in fact, successful in offering a critique of power that 
oppresses conceptions of gender or creates oppression for specific gender conceptions 
based on essentialist understandings.  Justifications for oppression, binaries, and forms of 
disempowerment based on natural or essential characteristics have no grounding.  Since 
truth, values, and individual characteristics are now based solely on individual or social 
creation, nothing can be said to be essentially one way or another.  No sex or gender can 
be essentially defined, and no conception of sex or gender can be essential privileged 
over the other.  Gender characteristics and “truth” about gender is a social or individual 
construction and practice, rather than something essential or objective.  From the anti-
essentialist conception of truth, gender traits are contingent upon social constructions and 
individual practice. 
 However, as I have shown, this paradigm is not as emancipatory as it may 
intuitively seem.  Though oppression from essentialism is successfully deflated as based 
on false justifications, oppression and disempowerment can still be enforced.  Anti-
essentialism though, as presented by Nietzsche and James, actually entails oppression and 
a gender binary.  Nothing about anti-essentialist ideology changes the conceptual 
understanding of sex and gender, or that either category fails to be as rigid and exclusive 
as it is defines.  Any particular individual who identifies as or personifies the 
characteristics of a mixture of masculinity or femininity is automatically excluded and 
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oppressed under anti-essentialist frameworks, because gender and sex binaries are not 
analyzed or challenged.  Moreover, since anti-essentialism frames truth within individual 
or social creativity and practice, it enforces arguments for oppression and 
disempowerment.  Gender-based oppression could be a practical and acceptable 
consequence to engage social relations and politics, and thus wide-practiced and 
accepted.  James’ pragmatic approach to truth fails to exhaust its critique to include 
gender or sexual oppression.  Nietzsche’s framework fails in the same regard; oppression 
and disempowerment can be desired and adopted as values by individuals or social-
structures, and enforced by Nietzsche’s thought.  Though both are emancipatory in 
engaging oppression based on essential natures, they fail in a number of other regards to 
be feminist valuable for a feminist critique. 
 De Beauvoir understood the powerful significance of anti-essentialist thought, but 
also recognized the potential danger of the framework left on its own with no expansion 
or synthesis.  Though de Beauvoir utilizes particular aspects of anti-essentialist thought, 
she expands the framework to actively include a critique of subversive power relations 
and gender oppression.  De Beauvoir understands individuals as the French existentialists 
do, claiming that individuals have no binding natures or characteristics other than 
uncontrollable facets of identity such as race or ancestry.  Thus, no essential gender 
tropes exist that can truthfully define individuals, and all individuals possess the 
autonomy to choose how they wish to identify.  A sense of agency is involved where 
individuals choose what values and identity categories that they conform to.   
However, as de Beauvoir rightfully concludes, this sense of freedom and 
transcendent choice that individuals possess is only socially accessible to those whom are 
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privileged and have mobility awarded by a social power system.  De Beauvoir is critical 
of prior feminist theory, since it, as she claims, fails to analyze gender and the situation of 
“woman” in correct terms, and simply advocates for equal political advancement.  This 
advancement will not be possible, though, because only masculinity is allowed to freely 
choose and practice individual autonomy, where femininity is defined by the context, in 
opposition to masculinity, and thus unable to choose or transcend the situation of 
“Other.”  Whatever “man” is defined as being, though its own values which shape the 
value structure of a context, “woman” is defines as its opposite and “woman’s” autonomy 
is elusive.  Gender is defined in purely anti-essential terms, conceptualized and 
understood relative to a particular context.  De Beauvoir is advocating for political and 
social power to equalize autonomy and conceptualize gender categories as less rigid.  
Since agents can choose what values and identities they take on, masculine values or 
feminine values are not so rigidly defined; “man” can take on feminine values and vice-
versa.  This view obviously incorporates notions of anti-essentialism, but expands the 
framework to include a critique of gender and an etymology of gender classifications.   
De Beauvoir’s theory, though a breakthrough in feminist theory, still operates 
within a gender binary and presents as unified definition of “woman”, and of gendered 
categories.  De Beauvoir’s theory, therefore, operates within the same essential and 
coercive structure of power as oppressive politics does, and it unable to offer a robust 
critique of this power and its conclusions.  De Beauvoir, while attempting to define what 
“woman” is in order to advocate for political and social autonomy, essentializes 
“woman” by defining the terms as relative to “man.”  A unified and essential 
classification is presented in order to define and represent “woman” for a feminist 
55 
 
critique.  De Beauvoir also enforces a sex/gender binary by assuming that masculinity 
and femininity or “man” and “woman” are the only two gender and sex categories.  Thus, 
autonomy to identity as mixed-gender or mixed-sex, or outside of the paradigm of 
binaried sex and gender, is not distinguishable under de Beauvoir’s feminist theory.  In an 
attempt to liberate and include “woman” with the social and intellectual privileges that 
“man” is awarded, de Beauvoir entails various forms of oppression by defining “woman” 
as an essential and unified category of analysis, and limiting the sphere of sex and gender 
to the widely-accepted gender/sex binary.  In order for feminist theory to be fully 
inclusive and avoid being paradoxical, the sex gender binary must be deconstructed and 
essentialist notions of identity and unification must cease to be utilized for feminist 
theory and identity politics.  If not, feminism will continue to be a form of oppression and 
thus struggle to operate outside of oppressive sociopolitical power and the binding 
categories that this power entails.   
Butler’s move into “third wave” feminist theory offers a workable framework for 
feminism to challenge oppressive charges brought against it, and to challenge coercive 
power and the sex/gender binary.  Under this conception, “woman” is not a unified 
category defined by some type of shared identity or essential characteristic.  This 
ideology fails to consider the difference in subjects of “woman,” and serves as a mode of 
oppression for those who do not fit the white, middle-class, heterosexual idea of what 
“woman” is as defined by sociocultural norms.  A universal identity cannot account for 
cross-cultural, historical, or sexual differences.  A type of feminist theory that 
universalizes “woman” as something that essentially “is” consequently serves to enforce 
a regulative power structure that defines individuals and enforces the oppressive norms of 
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the structure that it is attempting to criticize.  Though the idea of creating a recognized 
subject seems necessary for political emancipation, the practicality of that action enforces 
the oppressive means that the subject is attempting to emancipate itself from.   
Appealing to a political power structure for emancipation is, as an act, 
paradoxical, since the political power structure is the force that creates and subjugates the 
situation of “woman” in the first place.  Political power serves as the regulatory force that 
creates and produces situations, values, and ideologies that define a context or subject.  
Through prohibitive and regulatory laws, but under the guise of being the natural and 
logical sources of representation, political power creates the subject and subjects 
‘situations.  It also creates the binaried structure of sex/gender, in order to conform to the 
heterosexual ordering of society.  Notions of binaried gender are created, opposed, and 
serve to create sex and dominates language and discourse within that given structure.  
“Representational” power creates the structure of gender and desire, naturalizes it, and 
thus controls subjects.  Gender, therefore, is not binaried or natural; it is a trope 
established by power in order to situate social relations in a manipulative and 
heteronormative way.  With this understanding, gender is not limited to the framework of 
the female feminine and the male masculine, but based on individual desires existing 
within, but subverting, the heterosexual matrix.  Butler utilizes notions of anti-
essentialism and anti-binaried conceptions of gender to present a powerful and subversive 
critique, while dismantling rigid notions of gender categories and the elusive criterion 
that define them.  Heteronormative standards are deconstructed and the notion of 
normativity within gender, sexual, and social identities is challenged.  Butler, as opposed 
to James, Nietzsche, and de Beauvoir, offers a critique of power and normative standards 
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without using oppressive and exclusionary methods, or the methods utilized by coercive 
power itself.                                                  
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